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Drastically reducing fiscal deficits has been increasingly advocated as an 
urgent priority across Europe and the US. The election of a Conservative-led 
coalition government in the UK in the Spring of 2010 and the Eurozone crisis 
and sovereign bail-outs during 2011 have motivated this recent fixation 
with fiscal retrenchment. 
Once elected, The UK’s coalition government was quick to announce 
ambitious targets for public sector net borrowing for the fiscal period 
2009/10 to 2015/16. As the table below documents, it aimed to quickly 
reduce such borrowing from 11% of GDP to 1.1% of GDP, mainly via 
expenditure cuts. 
Such an agenda would imply eliminating the deficit on the current budget 
by 2015/16. The government argued in its October 2010 spending review 
(HM Treasury , 2010) that failure to take such action would put the UK’s 
economic recovery at risk and place an unfair debt burden on future 
generations. 
In its 2011 budget statement (HM Treasury, 2011), it has re-affirmed its 
ambitious fiscal targets though it has also exhibited a new interest in 
stimulating private investment -- apparently fearing that economic growth 
was beginning to falter.
In recent months, Ireland and countries in Southern Europe (especially 
Greece and Portugal) have been put under mounting pressure to adopt 
similarly demanding fiscal targets. Most recently, the budget debate 
in the US has dramatically flared up, with Republicans in the House of 
Representatives leading intense lobbying for a radical slashing of public 
expenditures. 
The Likely Economic Impact
In this Development Viewpoint, we try to assess the likely economic impact 
of the widespread adoption of radical deficit reduction. In order to do so, we 
conduct an experiment in which all countries that could be considered ‘at 
risk’ (namely, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain and the US) replicate the 
UK’s target of reducing public sector net borrowing to 1.1% of GDP by 2015.
However, in order to ensure the realism of this experiment, we also assume 
that oil prices will rise by a third over the course of 2011, driven principally by 
the ongoing political turmoil in the Middle East and the nuclear energy scare 
in Japan. This is a sensible assumption given recent trends.
Our approach is to use the ‘State of the World Economy’ global 
macroeconomic model to compare two basic scenarios (See SOWE for more 
information on the model). The first scenario is the ‘business as usual’, or 
baseline, scenario, in which current trends are simply projected through 
2015. The second scenario alters this baseline by introducing the fiscal 
retrenchment and the oil price shock that we have described above.
Our main concern is to evaluate the likely impact of the second scenario, 
through 2015, on the countries undertaking drastic belt tightening. The 
data for the SOWE model allow us to assess the impact on Southern Europe 
as a whole and both the UK and the US individually.  Though we are also 
concerned about the impact of deficit reduction on trends in the global 
economy, developing countries and other developed economies, these are 
not the focus of this Development Viewpoint.
In assessing impact, we concentrate on changes in several macroeconomic 
variables: GDP, employment, private investment and public debt as a ratio to 
GDP. 
Regression to Recession
What is the projected impact on the UK and Southern Europe? They both fall 
back into a recession over the course of 2011 and 2012 and remain in such a 
condition until 2015 (See Figure 1). While the US is not projected to fall into
recession, its average GDP growth rate remains 1-2 percentage points lower 
than in the baseline scenario. As a result of these effects, the growth of world 
income remains about one percentage point lower than in the baseline until 
2015. 
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Net Borrowing 11.0 10.1 7.5 5.5 3.5 2.1 1.1
Budget Deficit -7.5 -7.5 -5.7 -4.0 -2.3 -0.9 0.0
Table: Office of Budget Responsibility Forecasts for the 
UK’s Public Borrowing 2009/10-2015/16
Source: HM Treasury, 2010
US
Source: SOWE Database Baseline Deficit Reduction
UK Southern Europe
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The fiscal retrenchment, not higher oil prices, appears to be the main 
source of the projected contractions in GDP in the ‘at-risk’ economies. One 
supporting piece of evidence is that other countries and regions are only 
marginally affected by the deficit-reduction scenario. 
Major developed and emerging countries and regions maintain roughly 
similar GDP growth rates as in the baseline scenario. For example, GDP 
growth rates in Germany, China and Japan are less than 0.25 percentage 
point lower in this scenario than under the baseline for the period up to 
2015.
The Spectre of Unemployment 
A particularly disturbing trend is the growth in unemployment across the 
countries adopting fiscal retrenchment. The UK and the US are particularly 
affected. In the UK employment figures for 2010 and early 2011 have already 
shown signs of decline. In fact, in March 2011 unemployment in the UK hit a 
17-year high (BBC website). The coalition government’s continued pursuit of 
aggresive budget cutting is projected to turn growth rates of employment 
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In the US, budget tightening is likely to jeopardize the recent trend of falling 
unemployment due to economic recovery. Similar to the UK, the US is also 
projected to experience negative 1-2% employment growth (i.e. rising 
unemployment) each year until 2015.
Southern Europe is also projected to experience negative growth of 
employment, although to a lesser degree than in the US and UK. 
Private Investment
In the UK, the Tory-led government has argued that the large public 
expenditures under previous Labour governments crowded out private 
investment. Thus, substantially reducing public expenditures, it contends, 
should boost confidence in the private sector and lead thereby to significant 
increases in private investment. 
Unfortunately, our model’s projections offer little support for such 
predictions. As a ratio to GDP, private investment remains largely unchanged 
in the UK, the US and Southern Europe. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
our scenario projects overall declines in GDP and employment: the lacklustre 
performance of private investment fails to compensate for the substantial 
fall in aggregate demand triggered by hefty budget cuts. 
Public Debt to GDP 
One of the major motivations of the UK’s coalition government for 
eliminating the fiscal deficit by 2015/16 is to set public-sector debt on a 
downward trajectory. However, our scenario for fiscal retrenchment suggests 
that in the US and the UK, public debt as a percentage of GDP would remain 
largely unchanged through 2015, compared to the trend for the baseline 
scenario, and that this ratio would increase for Southern Europe. 
Upon reflection, such results are not surprising given the projected declines 
in GDP (the denominator of the ratio) as a result of the throttling of 
aggregate demand through public-sector cutbacks.  
Summary
This Development Viewpoint has illustrated that if the Tory-inspired public 
belt tightening is adopted as well by the US and the countries ‘at risk’ in 
Southern Europe, the medium-term economic impacts through 2015 
would be severe. Not only would the growth of GDP and employment be 
negatively affected, but also private investment would languish and the 
ratio of public debt to GDP would not, in fact, fall, and would even likely rise 
for some countries. 
Though policies of fiscal retrenchment are hailed by many conservative 
economists as a necessary remedy—and even begrudgingly supported 
by numerous other ‘progressive’ economists as inescapable—our model 
projections suggest  that the outcomes will largely be counter-productive, 
and principally for the countries being currently counselled to implement 
them.
References: 
HM Treasury (2011). Budget 2011, TSO: Norwich, March 2011
HM Treasury (2010). Spending Review 2010, TSO: Norwich, October 2010
Figure 2: Employment Growth Rates (%) in the US, UK and Southern 
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